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Economic Institutions and the
Satisfaction of Human Needs
Ian Gough
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate different economic sys-
tems using as a criterion their ability to satisfy human needs. The
conceptual basis is the theory of human need developed in Doyal
and Gough [1991] and briefly summarized here. To assess the
potential of economic systems to satisfy human needs, thus
defined, I use a family of theoretical approaches from different
disciplines broadly labelled "new institutionalist" or "new political
economy." The economic systems to be investigated are distin-
guished according to their dominant organizing principle: the
market, the state, and the community. Recognizing that "pure"
models of each are historically and logically impossible, I evaluate
combinations of institutions that are as close as possible to the
pure model: minimally regulated capitalism, state socialism, and
variants of communitarianism. Afler summarizing my conclusions
at that point, I then, in the next three sections, go on to consider
three variants of "mixed economy" capitalism: statist capitalism,
corporatist capitalism, and neoliberal capitalism. Again I evaluate
each according to our criteria of need satisfaction before drawing
some general conclusions.
The author is Reader in Social Policy at Manchester University. The author
wishes to thank David Donaldson, Diane Elson. Andrew Gamble, Geoff Hodgson,
Mick Moran, Peter Penz, David Purdy, and Paul Wilding for helpful comments on
an earlier draft. The paper has originated out of, and is indebted to, years of
discussion and collaborative work with Len Doyal.
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Since this is an extremely ambitious project, it has necessary
limits that should be emphasized. First, the sole criterion accord-
ing to which economic systems are compared is the optimum satis-
faction of universal human needs, which will be defined shortly.
Second, the focus is on need satisfaction within, not between, na-
tion-states. It excludes global linkages between nation-states. Ef-
fectively, this limits my focus to the developed world, though I
believe that some of the arguments are relevant for developing na-
tions too. Third, it is concerned only with the ability of economic
systems to satisfy present levels of need satisfaction: issues of
economic sustainability and intragenerational redistribution are
left to one side. These are serious limitations, but they are made
necessary by the scope of the investigation remains. The paper is
necessarily broad and relies on secondary sources to buttress many
of its claims.
Need-Satiafaction as a Measure of Welfare Outcomes
This paper attempts to evaluate socioeconomic systems and in-
stitutions according to the anticipated welfare outcomes enjoyed by
their citizens. Welfare outcomes are conceived in terms of the level
of satisfaction of basic human needs. This approach thus differs
from much contemporary research in both comparative social
policy and economics. The former has sought to explain variations
in "welfare states" by analyzing specific welfare inputs, such as
levels of state expenditure on social security, or more recently, wel-
fare outputs, such as the specific social policies or the "welfare
state regimes" that characterize syndromes of social policies.^
Much economics research, on the other hand, has concerned itself
with the final outcomes of policies but has traditionally defined
these rather narrowly, such as, for example, rates of economic
growth, monetary stability, rates of unemployment and employ-
ment, and productivity growth [Strumpel and Scholz 1987; cf. Put-
terman 1990]. Freeman [1989] undertakes a much broader and
more sophisticated evaluation of four "political economies," yet he
still restricts his evaluative criteria to two: growth rates and dis-
tributional equity.
Both these approaches tend to ignore the final impact of all
these factors on the levels and distribution of well-being of the
populations concerned (though this gap has been recognized by
some such as Alber et al. [1987]). The major reason for the lack of
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progress here is an inability to agree on concepts and measures of
well-being that have cross-cultural validity. The postwar period
has witnessed a growth in research that utilizes concepts such as
the "level of living," "social indicators," "basic needs," and "human
development" and that has informed comparative evaluation of
welfare outcomes in the Third World. However, this work has had
little impact due in part to the changed political and economic
climate of the 1980s. It has also been criticized as lacking a unify-
ing conceptual framework [Sen 1987] and more particularly for in-
corporating Western cultural and political biases in the very
notions of universal need and social progress [Rist 1980; Doyal
and Gough 1991, chap.8]. Though some of these issues have been
addressed in some of the philosophical literature on need, there
has existed a barrier between this literature and the more applied
development literature.
The absence of a theoretically grounded and operational con-
cept of objective human need has inhibited the development of a
common calculus for evaluating human welfare. On the contrary,
there is a widespread scepticism that human needs exist, or a
belief that all needs are relative. Typical of the first view are
neoliberals, such as Hayek and Flew, together with the dominant
strand in neoclassical economics. The second view, that needs
exist but are relative, takes a variety of forms. For many Mar-
xists, human needs are historically relative to capitalism; for
various critics of cultural imperialism, needs are specific to, and
can only be known by, members of groups defined by gender, race,
and so on; for phenomenologists and some social researchers,
needs are socially constructed; for post-modernist critics and
"radical democrats," needs are discursive and do not exist inde-
pendently of the consciousness of human agents [Doyal and
Gough 1991, chap. 1]. Clearly, if any of these perspectives are cor-
rect, then any common yardstick of welfare is unattainable and
cannot be used to compare and evaluate different economic in-
stitutions and systems.
Our theory attempts to overcome these limitations. The theory
is both substantive and procedural: substantive in defending, con-
ceptualizing, and operationalizing the idea of universal human
needs; procedural in recognizing the inevitable social determina-
tion of products, policies, and processes that satisfy needs and
thus in recognizing the necessity for procedures for resolving dis-
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putes in as rational and democratic a way as possible. I will merely
list the conclusions of our substantive theory here.
We argue that all persons have an objective interest in avoiding
serious harm that in turn prevents them from pursuing their
vision of the good, whatever that is [Doyal and Goug^ 1991, chap.
4]. This pursuit of the good entails, as others have argued, an
ability to participate in the form of life in which they find themsel-
ves. Thus, objective basic needs consist, at the least, in those
universal preconditions that enable sustained participation in
one's form of life. At the most, they consist of those universal
preconditions for critical participation in one's form of life-the
capacity to situate it, to criticize it, and, if necessary, to act to
change it. Basic human needs, then, are the universal prereq-
uisites for successful and, if possible, critical participation in one's
social form of life. We identify these universal prerequisites as
physical health and autonomy. In turn, autonomy of agency-the
capacity to make informed choices about what should be done and
how to go about doing it-is impaired when there is a deficit of
three attributes: mental health, cognitive skills, and opportunities
to engage in social participation.
Recognizing that these common human needs can be met in a
multitude of different ways by an almost infinite variety of specific
satisfiers, we next go on to identify those characteristics of need
satisfiers that everywhere contribute to improved physical health
and autonomy [Doyal and Gough 1991, chap. 8]. These we label
"universal satisfier characteristics," or "intermediate needs" for
short. We group these characteristics into 11 categories: adequate
nutritional food and water, adequate protective housing, a non-
hazardous work environment, a nonhazardous physical environ-
ment, appropriate health care, security in childhood, significant
primary relationships, physical security, economic security, safe
birth control and childbearing, and appropriate basic and cross-
cultural education. Nine of these apply to all people, one refers to
the specific needs of children, and another to the specific needs of
women for safe child bearing. All 11 are essential to protect the
health and autonomy of people and thus to enable them to par-
ticipate to the maximum extent in their social form of life,
whatever that is.
As developed thus far, our theory of needs is substantive, or "in-
trinsic" [Hewitt 1992, chap. 10]. It identifies universal basic and
intermediate needs and legitimizes the use of cross-cultural social
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indicators with which to chart need satisfactions. It thus provides
a means of empirically comparing the welfare performance of dif-
ferent societies [Doyal and Gough 1991, chaps. 12-13]. However,
my purpose here is to investigate theoretically the contribution of
different social institutions to the satisfaction of these needs,
which leads me on to the procedural dimension of our theory.
Here, we indentify universal procedural and material precondi-
tions for enhancing need satisfaction [Doyal and Gough 1991,
chaps. 7 and 11]. These are attributes of social systems, and it is
these with which I am principally concerned in this paper.
Procedural preconditions relate to the ability of a group to
identify needs and appropriate need satisfiers in a rational way
and to prioritize need satisfiers and the need satisfactions of dif-
ferent groups. In the face of radical disagreements over the per-
ceived interests and needs of different groups, how can this best
be achieved? To answer this we draw upon the works of Habermas
and Rawls to sketch out certain communicational and constitu-
tional preconditions for optimizing need satisfaction in practice.
Habermas outlines a theory of communicational competence that
emphasizes the importance, for the rational resolution of debates-
including debates about need satisfaction, of the best available un-
derstanding and of truly democratic debate [Habermas 1970;
Roderick 1986]. With modifications to his three principles, we
argue that Rawls [1972] identifies the constitutional framework
that will enable citizens to engage in such debate.
In what follows, I will summarize our procedural preconditions
under three headings.
PI. Rational identification of needs. Needs are defined and dis-
tinguished from wants by appealing to an externally verifiable
stock of codified knowledge, for example, knowledge about nutri-
tion, child-rearing, or environmental control. The ability to tap
and rationally to utilize this stock of codified knowledge—to engage
in collectively identifying common human needs-is a first precon-
dition for improving need satisfaction.
P2. Use of practical knowledge. At the next level, appropriate
need satisfiers have to be selected. Here we argue that the
codified knowledge needs to be complemented by the experiential-
ly grounded understanding of people in their everyday lives. For
present purposes, we will assume that this knowledge can be
tapped in one of two basic ways. First, there is participation in
market relations, where these are relatively unconstrained by con-
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tingencies of power or ignorance. Second, there are various forms
of political participation and "claimsmaking" [Drover and Kerans
1993]-the process whereby people collectively identify their dis-
satisfactions, name their felt needs, and make claims against a
variety of institutions.
P3. Democratic resolution. If a rational policy to identify and
prioritize need satisfiers must draw on both codified and experien-
tially grounded knowledge, then the inevitable disagreements that
result must be confronted and resolved in a forum as open, as
democratic, and as free of vested interests as possible. This is the
third procedural precondition by which different socioeconomic in-
stitutions will be evaluated.
Next, "material preconditions" refer to the capacity of economic
systems to produce and deliver the necessary and appropriate need
satisfiers and to transform these into final need satisfactions. We
argue that there is a strong moral case for codifying the inter-
mediate needs identified earlier in the form of state-guaranteed
rights. However, the de jure codification of social or welfare rights
is no guarantee of their de facto delivery. To assess the latter, we
develop a cross-cultural model of material production [Doyal and
Gough 1991, chap. 11] that yields four material preconditions for
improved need satisfaction. These include:
Ml. Production. The greater the total quantity and quality of
need satisfiers produced, the greater the potential need satisfac-
tion. The efficiency by which need satisfiers are produced is thus
the first of our material preconditions.
M2. Distribution. Next, need satisfaction is maximized if these
satisfiers are distributed in line with the needs of individuals. This
normally entails individuals in households, though for certain col-
lective satisfiers the unit of consumption is different and larger.
M3. Need transformation. These satisfiers are then transformed
into individual need satisfactions, a process that predominantly
takes place within (various sorts of) households. This, we argue,
will reflect the distribution of satisfiers within the household, in
particular the degree of equality between men, women, and
children. Final levels of need satisfaction will also be affected by
the direct effect of production processes and the quality of the
natural environment on human welfare.
M4. Material reproduction. The above processes take place
through time, which requires that the stock of capital goods,
natural resources, and human resources be at least maintained in
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order to ensure further rounds of production and need satisfaction
in the future. Though difficult issues of sustainability are raised
here, a theory of human need must encompass material reproduc-
tion and must extend beyond short-term horizons.
However, I have already indicated that to simplify the
analysis, this fourth material precondition is unfortunately
omitted here. Thus, I am left with three procedural and three
material criteria with which to evaluate different economic sys-
tems.^
A Theoretical Framework for Macro-Social Analysis
Different economic arrangements are to be evaluated according
to these criteria. To do this requires a set of theories and as-
sociated knowledge with two major characteristics. First, they
should be broadly applicable to a variety of socioeconomic sys-
tems, yet be sensitive to the institutional variations between
them. Second, they should bridge the central fault-line in social
science between the disciplines of economics and sociopolitical
science. I will use for this purpose a body of works that can be
grouped under the labels of "comparative political economy" and
"the new institutionalism." This body of work has arisen at the
confluence of economics and sociopolitical science as a critique of
the dominant paradigms in each: rational choice theory in
economics and functionalism/behaviorism in sociology [Cammack
1989]. It represents a return to the central concerns of classical
political economy of Smith and his followers and to the critique of
that political economy by Marx. Both were concerned with the
relation between the economy and the state and with the effect of
such relations on human welfare [Esping-Andersen 1990, chap. 1;
Gough 1979, chap. 1]. It also embraces the economic sociology
pioneered by Weber [Holton 1992]. Let me briefly consider both
strands separately.
On the one side, institutional economics emerged, initially in
the United States with the work of Commons and Veblen, who
were dissatisfied with neoclassical economics and desired to refor-
mulate the discipline in at least three directions.^ First, technol-
ogy and preferences are no longer conceived of as exogenous. The
economic environment is recognized as affecting access to infor-
mation and the way that information is processed. This under-
mines the view that individual agents are continuously
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maximizing or optimizing in any meaningful sense since their
preferences are continually adapting in the light of their ex-
perience. Therefore, second, the neoclassical assumption of equi-
librium is replaced with the idea of agents learning and acting
through real historical time. Economic life is characterized by
structural, not just "parametric" uncertainty, which imposes on ac-
tors a reliance on routines and habits. These durable patterns of
behavior define social institutions. The third characteristic of in-
stitutional economics is thus a recognition of the role of institu-
tions in economic life and a rejection of essentialist arguments
about "the market." Self-seeking action and institutional struc-
tures combine to generate a process through time characterized by
long periods of continuity punctuated by rapid breaks or institu-
tional shifts. This paradigm also directs our attention to the in-
stitutional contrasts between different economic systems.
Within social and political science, developments from a very
different starting point have resulted in a rather similar set of
propositions. In explaining state activity within capitalist societies,
the dominant paradigm was some form of structuralism, whether
framed by the requirements of industrial society and its economic,
demographic, and bureaucratic correlates, or the requirements of
capitalist society for the performance of accumulation and
legitimation functions. In both cases, the economy was conceptual-
ized as isolated from social and political institutions, and the latter
were accorded no sources of autonomous development.
One attempt to overcome some of these problems can be traced
to central European scholars such as Polanyi [1957]° and Schum-
peter [1976], for whom the interdependence of the market economy
with the state and the community was a sine qua non. Another
source of alternative thought has been the work of those scholars
who, in the tradition of Mill and deTocqueville, recognize the im-
pact of democracy on state development. More recently, there has
been the project of "bringing the state back in" with its emphasis
on the state as an autonomous or independent actor, with certain
specific interests, that can act creatively to define problems and
develop policy [Evans et al. 1985; Skocpol 1985]. All these ap-
proaches attach little weight to the role of particular classes or so-
cial agents in explaining state activity [Esping-Andersen 1990,
chap. 1]. A common idea is that of institutional persistence and its
corollaries. Institutions are enduring, which means that at any
time any particular institution, including state structures, can be
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"sub-optimal" or, to use a more explicit and loaded term, "dysfunc-
tional" for the system as a whole [Cammack 1989].
Another strand in the reaction to structuralist perspectives in
social and political theory has identified social classes as a key
political agent. Developing from social democratic theorists of the
Austrian school, this strand has emerged as the class mobilization
thesis associated with various Scandinavian writers [Korpi 1983;
Esping-Andersen 1985]. Another source has been a "contradictory"
Marxist analysis that stresses the role of class conflict in shaping
social and state development [Gough 1979]. Alongside and partly
critical of these, a broader, more diffuse institutionalism has
developed in recent years that recognizes the role of other institu-
tions, including firms, other economic organizations, and bodies
representing class interests. This sociological institutionalism
varies according to whether or not it countenances an explicit role
for structural or environmental forces alongside institutional be-
havior in explaining policy developments.
One prominent characteristic of all these sociopolitical or "his-
torical-structural" schools of new institutionalism is a view of in-
stitutional change as discontinuous, contested, and problematic.
Another is the situation of societal and state-centered variables
within a more systemic framework. For example, according to
Hall [1986], the major components in explaining changes in public
policy are the organization of capital, labor, the state and the
political system, and the position of the nation within the interna-
tional political economy. Within this field, however, institutions
resist change and develop in a path-dependent manner.
Taken all together, these "new institutionalist" theories mark a
convergence between economic and sociopolitical analysis, which
provides a fertile framework for a macro-social analysis of
economic institutions. In particular, they enable comparisons to
be made of different socioeconomic systems and different stages of
development. It is this framework of institutionalist thinking that
I will use to derive hypotheses concerning the impact of different
economic systems on levels of need satisfaction.
A Taxonomy of Economic Institutions
Economic debate and policy prescription today is dominated by
the respective merits of markets and public planning, so much so
that it is tempting to focus on free market capitalism, centrally
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planned economies, and various sorts of market-planning mix.
However, this would neglect a third set of economic relationships
currently being rediscovered in the economics literature, which can
be gathered under the label "community." The list of writers thus
distinguishing three fundamental forms of economic organization
is long. It includes economic historians [Polanyi 1957, chap. 4; Bos-
well 1990], political scientists [Streeck and Schmitter 1985],
sociologists [Bradach and Eccles 1989], organizational theorists
[Powell 1990], and institutional economists [Thompson 1991].
Table 1 illustrates the key concepts identified in some of these
taxonomies.
Table 1. Taxonomies of Economic Systems
Author
Polanyi
Streeck/
Schmitter
Bradach/
Eccles
Powell
Principle
Forms of
integration
Principles of
coordination
and allocation
Economic
control
mechanisms
Forms of
economic
coordination
Market
Market
exchange
Dispersed
competition
Price
Markets
State
Redistribution
Hierarchial
control
Authority
Hierarchy
Community
Reciprocity
Spontaneous
solidarity
Trust
Networks
Drawing on Polanyi [1957] and Putterman [1990, chap. 1], we
can substantively define the economy as the sphere of social ac-
tivity in which people produce, distribute, and consume the
material requirements to meet their wants and needs. This
generates recurring interactions among elements and agents in
the system. According to all the major representatives of classical
political economy, including Smith and Marx, a major feature of
such interaction is a division of labor, both within "enterprises"
and between them. This division of labor raises productivity but in
turn requires some mechanism or mechanisms for coordinating the
actions of the numerous interacting agents. It is to this fundamen-
tal question that the three solutions identified above have emerged
over the course of human history.^
First, I look at markets. Here private agents exchange entitle-
ments to goods and services with each other. Where a large num-
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her of such commodity exchanges regularly take place we can
identify the social institutions of a market. This fonn of coordina-
tion entails private rights in the use, consumption, disposition,
and fruits of economic resources and goods and the rights to trans-
fer these rights, except the ownership of labor [Putterman 1990,
59-60]. The prices or terms at which these exchanges take place is
determined solely by the free negotiation of the parties concerned.
Thus, economic coordination is decentralized, ex post, and uncon-
scious.
The second form of coordination is by authoritative regulations
issued in hierarchical organizations. Where these organizations
are themselves coordinated by authoritative regulation backed by
coercion, we may speak of a state system of coordination. Such a
system normally entails state ownership of the means of produc-
tion, apart from labor. Coordination here is thus centralized, ex
ante, and conscious.
The third ideal-type form of economic coordination is more dif-
ficult to specify. Nowhere in the modem world does it provide a
general mode of economic coordination, though it exists within
certain sectors such as some voluntary organizations and social
movements. When "community" is advocated as a normative
model of a desirable economic system, it appears in different
guises. Excluding those who explicitly identify community with
pre-modem, hierarchically organized, status-bound societies, we
are still lefl with a great variety of views. First, there is the idea
of communism held by radical socialist thinkers such as Marx,
Morris, and Kropotkin [Miller 1989]. This idea has been revived in
the last three decades in response partly to the belief that
developments within capitalism are laying the foundations for
communitarian economic relationships (in, for example, the work
of Gorz [1982] and Van der Veen and van Parijs [1987]). Second,
at the opposite pole, there is the libertarian view of community
espoused by Nozick [1974]. Here membership of a community is
voluntary and self-chosen. Third, there are new attempts to con-
ceptualize a "democratic communitarianism" drawing upon the
currents of decentralized socialism, personalist Christian democ-
racy, ideas of corporatism, and civic humanism [Boswell 1990].
This strand tends to equate community in the modem world with
national citizenship [Miller 1989]. The last two conceptions have
been explicitly concerned to augment those of market and state,
not to replace them.
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However, underlying these differences are some common
themes distinct from the other two modes. Economic coordination
within communities is by democratic negotiation. Solidaristic sen-
timents of loyalty and reciprocity within social groups facilitate
such consensus-building. The opposition between separatist in-
dividualism and state collectivism is overcome by a new focus on
the quality of human relations. Coordination may thus be con-
ceived as decentralized, ex ante, and conscious.
In the next three sections, I will evaluate the potential con-
tribution of these three forms of economic coordination to the satis-
faction of human needs. The intention is to try, so far as is
possible, to abstract from real-world complexities by considering
these three economic systems as "ideal types." However, this is not
strictly possible. According to the "impurity principle," any actual
socioeconomic system will contain, alongside its dominant prin-
ciple, at least one other economic structure based on different prin-
ciples for the whole to function [Hodgson 1984, 85-9 and 104-9].
Thus, market economies must incorporate a system of authority
and operate within a set of specific social relationships. A pure
market society is a logical contradiction. Similarly, a centrally
planned economy encounters contradictions that can only be
resolved via decentralized market and civil relationships. In these
two cases, then, I consider models that incorporate the minimum
degree of "impurity" or contamination by other principles, drawing
on empirical and historical evidence where appropriate. The third
form of economic coordination, via community networks, poses dif-
ferent problems since it has not existed as an even modestly self-
sustaining form in the modem age. I will consider briefly
conceptions of community as an overarching principle of economic
coordination before again pointing out the dependence of such a
principle on the other two modes of economic coordination.
Free Market Capitalism
The defining characteristic of a free market economy is that
economic coordination is decentralized, emerges as a result of
various individual actions, and is not consciously controlled. Free
market capitalism is used here to refer to a combination of this
form of coordination and private property ownership. It is this that
I will now briefly evaluate according to the societal preconditions
for optimizing need satisfaction sketched earlier.
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Our first procedural precondition is excluded by definition.
There is no collective sphere of economic decision making. Free
market capitalism is an economic system that responds to con-
sumer wants backed by money-a system in which literally nobody
makes decisions on the composition of output and its relation to
human needs. Against this it can be argued that capitalism ex-
tends, to the maximum feasible extent, people's freedom to
negotiate about human needs. If individuals are sufficiently well
informed and have the freedom to act on that information, then it
can be claimed that subjectively defined wants will closely ap-
proximate generaiizable human needs.
The second procedural precondition-that the practical know-
ledge of people be effectively tapped in identifying improved need
satisfiers-constitutes a strong claim for markets. Markets make
use of the dispersed knowledge of millions of actors, and the con-
tinual process of discovery that they are free and able to make en-
genders the restless innovation and productivity of capitalism.
The third condition-a democratic forum within which debates
over how best to meet needs can take place—is also claimed for
capitalism. The conjoint development of capitalism and of certain
forms of representative democracy in much of the world stems
from the decentralization of decision making and power in market
society. Furthermore, decentralized "claimsmaking" is facilitated
if citizens have the rights and capacities to form associations to
press their own perceptions of needs and satisfiers within the
political arena.
Against these claims must be set much recent analysis of un-
regulated markets and their political implications, which is
relevant to our first procedural precondition. Wants can diverge
from needs in significant ways, abetted by market society.
Markets are an inefficient source of knowledge and can interfere
with the communication processes necessary for human needs to
be identified and agreed upon. For example, it can be in the inter-
ests of individual producers to supply distorted information if this
will maximize profits and if they are able to do so. The sheer num-
ber of commodities produced in developed market societies means
that consumers have inadequate knowledge of their charac-
teristics and insufficient time to find out. Furthermore, it has
been argued that unregulated market society undermines com-
munal ties around which less individualistic conceptions of need
can form. If wants are endogenous to the economic system, this
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undermines any simple view of the market as a response
mechanism to autonomous consumer desires.^^
Unregulated markets can also distort the nature of democratic
debate within the political sphere. It is rational for actors to at-
tempt to pursue their interests within the political sphere, result-
ing in democratic abuses such as clientelism and worse. On the
other hand, markets offer commodified need satisfiers to those who
can afford them, which undermines their incentive to participate
in political debate over alternatives. Opportunities for exit reduce
voice. Last, the reliance of all existing market societies on a
gendered division of labor constrains the ability of women to par-
ticipate in democratic fora [Bowles and Gintis 1986, chaps. 4-5].
The implication of these critiques is that either authoritative
regulation or collective sentiments or both are necessary correc-
tives to the unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest in
market settings if human needs are to be recognized and
prioritized.
Turning to material preconditions, the claims of market
capitalism are strong. Markets not only utilize the dispersed
knowledge of millions of separate actors, but they also provide
them with incentives to act on that information in such a way as to
maximize efficiency at a moment of time [Hayek 1948; Gray 1992,
chap. 2]. Though the strong claims of Pareto efficiency require un-
realistic assumptions, the argument that markets enhance produc-
tive or "x-efficiency" remains. The ability of capitalism to produce
goods in prodigious quantities and to innovate totally novel kinds
of products is of considerable relevance in assessing its contribu-
tion to the satisfaction of human needs. However, it is not real-
world capitalism that is investigated here, but a model of a
minimally regulated market economy.
This model has several major weaknesses, according to a long
history of economic analysis. The failures of unregulated economic
markets to satisfy consumer wants are so well known that I will
not detail them here. They include tendencies to monopoly, the in-
ability of markets to supply public goods, the self-defeating produc-
tion of positional goods, and the inefficiency or diswelfares caused
by the tendency of markets to meet wants in commodified forms
[Penz 1986]. Laissez-faire capitalism may be an efficient system
for satisfying certain wants by means of commodities, but that is
all. There are further limitations stemming from the untram-
melled pursuit of individual self-interest. This engenders profound
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uncertainties, results in "prisoner's dilemma" situations where all
lose out in the absence of cooperation, and encourages oppor-
tunism and short-termism, which harms longer-term conceptions
of self-interest.
Second, the distribution resulting from the operation of un-
regulated markets cannot, even in rich societies, offer entitle-
ments to basic need satisfiers to all citizens [Sen 1981]. Regarding
our third material precondition, need transformation, market
society will tend to dissolve non-capitalist relations including
those between the sexes. However, recent scholarship contends
that gender inequalities are perpetuated via the conjunction of
paid and unpaid work and the institution of monogamous mar-
riage. A market economy requires altruistic, collective behavior on
the part of women in the household because their unpaid labor
provides a flexible cushion that permits men to respond to market
signals [Elson 1988]. Thus, formal equality coexists with gendered
inequality, that in turn affects the levels and distribution of need
satisfactions in society [Pateman 1988; Bowles and Gintis 1986,
chap. 4]. Furthermore, capitalism can harm those needs directly
met in relations either at work or in the community. The
autonomy of workers may be undermined once firms and factories
become established institutions in market societies and the tech-
nical division of labor is extended [Wood 1982]. At the same time,
the erosion of community bonds creates new diswelfares for which
more and more commodities cannot necessarily compensate
[Hirsch 1976].
To conclude, then, a minimally regulated, free market
capitalist society suffers from many drawbacks as an institutional
setting within which human needs can be satisfied. On both proce-
dural and material grounds, it is found wanting. As Polanyi has
argued, a strict market economy (even with the concessions to the
existence of other institutions made here) is neither desirable nor
logically possible. The implication of much institutional economic
analysis, as well as of political science and sociology, is that to
realize their procedural and material potential, market relations
need complementary regulation by public authorities and by net-
works of more solidaristic relations in civil society-what Etzioni
calls the "social capsule" [Etzioni 1988; cf. from different
standpoints Wolfe 1991 and Gray 1992]. It is much more interest-
ing to investigate various forms of mixed economic systems. But
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before I do that, I should turn to another relatively homogenous
economic system-^ centrally planned economy.
State Sociali8m
Here the dominant form of economic coordination is planning
by a central authoritative apparatus. Though this rules out private
property ownership, it does not entail any single form of collective
ownership. However, in historical practice (except in what was
Yugoslavia), de jure ownership of the bulk of capital and land has
been vested in the central state. Again, the extent to which this
economic system presupposes a specific political form of the state
is disputed. However, in all real-world cases since 1917, and before
the revolutionary reforms of 1989, representative democracy was
denied and official communist parties exercised a pervasive and
powerful role in the state apparatus. It is these forms of property
ownership and state that will be assumed in what follows.
State socialism, inaugurated in 1917, had as its conscious goal
to replace market-determined production for profit by planned
production for human needs. Of course, such a system can have,
and has had, different goals, such as victory in war or crash in-
dustrialization. Moreover, Marx and his followers drew a distinc-
tion between communism and socialism, between the terminus and
a station along the way. But let us accept, for the purposes of this
argument, that Marx's slogan "To each according to his needs" is
indeed the final goal of socialist society. How well is the model
state socialist economy sketched above able to realize this goal?
It forms a stark contrast with the previous model of unregu-
lated capitalism. Centralized planning to meet needs takes center
stage, whereas citizen participation, whether as economic or politi-
cal actors, is marginalized. In light of our procedural precondi-
tions, there are benefits and disadvantages. On the one hand,
codified knowledge can in theory be utilized effectively to identify
needs and to marshall resources to meet them, especially in condi-
tions of underdevelopment and scarcity. On the other hand, there
are few sites where the experientially grounded knowledge of
people can be utilized. They are denied a creative role in the
economic sphere. They are also prevented from making claims in
civil society and within the workplace. Finally the absence of civil
and political rights undermines the capacity of the political process
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rationally and democratically to adjudicate on different ways of
improving need satisfaction.
All these are clear procedural defects. What is more, the one
positive feature, a planning apparatus committed to improving
human welfare, has in practice severe limits. The political elite is
relatively insulated from other points of view, which results in a
distortion of the codified knowledge upon which planning is based.
The bureaucratic planning apparatus acquires considerable power
to pursue its own interests, establishing in the process what has
been called a "dictatorship over needs" [Feher et al. 1983].
As regards our material preconditions, state socialism exhibits
several advantages in principle over unregulated capitalism, at
least at low levels of development. The planning apparatus can
prioritize the production of basic need satisfiers such as basic
education, primary health care, basic foodstuffs, or family plan-
ning services. Entitlements to these can be ensured via such
measures as a radical redistribution of land assets, full employ-
ment policies, and direct public provision of services (though
regional variations in distribution are often harder to combat).
Need transformation can also be enhanced via policies to educate
and improve the status of women, to control births, and to provide
alternative forms of child care.
Against this must be set the case that central planning en-
counters growing problems of coordination, and notably so as
economic development proceeds. Centralized planning, even aided
with the most modern computers, cannot effectively coordinate
economic transactions in a modern economy where the number of
different products runs into the millions. The result is that large-
scale projects and homogenous products are given priority at the
expense of many essential yet disparate need satisfiers. Com-
partmentalization of interests within the planning apparatus in-
terferes v^ rith the adjudication between projects. More problematic,
at the enterprise level it is extremely difficult to set targets to
motivate managers and workers to produce what the plan re-
quires. Where targets are expressed in physical terms, factories
have an incentive to distort products in order to achieve target
specifications. This results in shortages and poor quality, which
embraces many key need satisfiers such as housing [Nove 1983].
At the distribution level too, the commitment to work-related
rewards can discriminate against those, especially women, with a
more tenuous link with paid labor, while special nonmonetary
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benefits for the elite undermine overall equality. There is no
countervailing system of distribution to that determined by the of-
ficial economy [Szelenyi 1978]. Despite a formal commitment to
political and economic equality for women, the structural proper-
ties of state socialism deny this in practice. Shortages and the at-
tendant queues add to the double burden stemming from a
gendered division of domestic labor. Not only does this harm the
need satisfaction of women, it can interfere with the effectiveness
of the need transformation process and thus the overall levels of
need satisfaction.
As with market economies, analysis and evidence suggest that
a relatively pure command economy is neither desirable nor
feasible, according to our need-related yardstick. This is perhaps
more surprising since both the intent and ideology of state
socialism have proclaimed the meeting of human needs as an ex-
plicit and high-priority goal. Yet the conclusion is clear: markets
and networks in civil society are necessary to overcome the
deficiencies of a pure central planning model. And indeed, this is
what was found in all state socialist societies between 1917 and
1989, albeit in distorted forms. All exhibited, alongside the official
economy, what Markus [1981] calls "second" and "third"
economies. The second economy was comprised of self-employed
and private production units together with "moonlighting" and
other unlawful enterprises. The third economy embraced the sys-
tem of "tolkachi"-networks of informal relations between and
within the bureaucracy and state enterprises formed to overcome
the mutual problems that they faced.
Community, Communitarianism, Communism
If community as a generalized system harks back to a mythical
past, communism reaches forward to a Utopian future. As
developed by the Utopian socialists and even their critic, Marx, it is
a society of absences: without markets and money, without state,
without hierarchical, horizontal, and sexual divisions of labor,
without inequality and scarcity. The tension between individual
self-interest and collective interest is overcome through the trans-
formation of social relations and human identity. For many critics,
this vision is not logically realizable: it is "evasive, confused and
problematic" [Soper 1981, chap. 9]. In particular, it overlooks the
constraints stemming from human psychology, human biology, and
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the limits to the biosphere. Yet the last two decades have wit-
nessed a renewed interest in communitarian alternatives, partly
in response to a view that technology and other trends make pos-
sible a post-industrial society of one form or another. These take
on board some of the above critiques, but hold onto some of the
basic tenets of a communitarian position: principles of spon-
taneous solidarity, relations of reciprocity, and small-scale com-
muntities with participatory democracy. An example is Gorz's
[1982] vision of a dual society, which combines a "heteronoous"
domain of work and authority alongside an autonomous domain of
self-determined activity, where the latter is dominant.
In terms of our procedural preconditions, such a model has one
major advantage. It permits what Miller calls "dialogic
democracy," a form of negotiation in which genuine learning takes
place including learning about basic needs and how to meet them.
People's experiential knowledge can be tapped, but sectional inter-
ests can be negotiated in a forum that would encourage the reach-
ing of a democratic and rational consensus [Miller 1989, chap. 9;
Doyal and Gough 1991, chap. 7]. Moreover, such democratic
negotiation would extend beyond the formal political arena to
embrace work relations and certain other relations within society.
It is likely that such an arrangement would also permit the
utilization of both codified and experiential knowledge in the
domain of production. The deficiencies of markets and state plan-
ning can be mollified if networks and negotiation generate alter-
native sources of information and motivation. This is more
probable if they are based on relations of trust, reciprocity, and
moral obligation [Boswell 1990, chap. 2]. Such a moral solidaristic
community could prioritize the production of need satisfiers, dis-
tribute them according to urgency of need, and reorder interper-
sonal relations to develop gender equality and more effective need
transformation. In this way, collective needs can be asserted over
individual wants as the dominant goal of a communitarian
economy.
Against this must be set several fundamental problems. First,
if such communities are "all-embracing" like medieval monas-
teries, they risk coercing their members into agreement about the
ends of life and the goals that individuals ought to value and pur-
sue. Individuals are "engulfed" by the community-in other words,
one of their basic needs, autonomy, is severely restricted [Plant et
al. 1980, chap. 10; Miller 1989, chap. 9]. This can be overcome if
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membership of communities is voluntary, as Nozick [1974] recom-
mends. But then another problem is faced: some individuals-"mis-
fits" and outsiders-would not be accepted by any community.
Excluded from the only social systems that offer participation and
sustenance, it is almost certain that their need satisfaction would
be threatened. A more general procedural problem arises because
solidaristic communities create distinctions between insiders and
outsiders, which inhibits the fostering of universalizable interests
and thus the identification of true human needs. To overcome this
requires some higher level of authority that is separate from and
superordinate to the separate communities.
In terms of our material preconditions, communitarianism ap-
pears at first sight superior to the other two alternatives. But
again, this is to simplify the relations of modem economies (or im-
plies turning one's back on the whole process of modernization and
the progress in meeting needs that this has sustained). Most com-
munitarian solutions pay insufficient attention to the problem of
coordination. For Gorz, local exchange of the products of small-
scale enterprise would be via the medium of "labor-time vouchers."
But as Nove [1983] has argued, either this requires very small-
scale production, in which many of the productive advantages of
contemporary capitalism are lost, or the value of the vouchers
would need to fluctuate according to supply and demand, in which
case they would be indistinguishable from money. Intercommunity
relations on a broader scale are still more intractable.^^ Moreover,
communitarian advocates like Gorz tend to evince a romantic view
of unpaid, communal, and household labor, ignoring much recent
feminist scholarship and its argument that "community is fun-
damentally a gendered concept" [Finch 1984,12].
For these and other reasons not adequately covered here, "com-
munities," even democratic and need-prioritizing ones, cannot by
themselves mobilize the resources necessary to optimize the need
satisfaction of their members. I have spent a short time on this
third set of economic institutions to disabuse any lingering belief
that "community," "reciprocity," "networking," or "negotiation" can
by themselves provide a third alternative to economic organization
and a surer way to meet human needs. It also sets the scene for an
integration of community with market and state, as proposed by
some recent writers.
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Summary So Far
Table 2 summarizes the pros and cons of the three "pure" or
paradigmatic systems of economic coordination as frameworks for
the optimization of need satisfaction. We may summarize their
deficiencies another way by returning to the ideas of need that
they each embody. Free market capitalism essentially equates
needs with wants, an equation that is logically flawed and morally
untenable [Doyal and Gough 1991, chaps. 2 and 61. State
socialism by contrast operates with an idea of universal and objec-
Table 2. Evaluation ofThree 'Pure" Economic Systems
Criteria
PI. Rational
identification
ofneed8
P2. Use of
practical
knowledge
P3.
Democratic
resolution
Ml.
Production
of need
satis flers
M2.
Distribution
according to
need
M3.
Effective
need
transfor-
mation
Market: Unregulated
Capitalism
Absent. Unregulated
markets weaken "social
capsule'VcoUective ethic
Markets tap but distort
dispersed knowledge
Representative
democracy weakened
by market exit and
inequality
EfHciency in commodity
production but market
failures and absence
of noncommodity forms
No entitlements to
need satisliers
Potential for autonomous
learning harmed by
inequality in work and
unpaid household labor
State:State
Socialism
Prioritization of,
but dictatorship
over, needs
Absent and
discouraged
Certain social
rights but
absence of civil
and political
rights
Prioritization of
need satisfiers.
but information
and motivation
failures
Entitlements
distorted by
abuse and labor
market links
Autonomous
learning restricted
at work, in
consumption, and
via unpaid house-
hold labor
Community:
Communism
Rational use of
codified
knowledge, but
incorporation of
individuals
Rational use of
dispersed
knowledge within.
not between.
communities
Widespread
dialogic
democracy.
Absence of
codified rights
Prioritization of
need satisfiers.
but problems
of coordination
between
communities
Entitlements to
need satisfiers
within, not
between.
communities
Greater free
time plus auto-
nomous domain.
but gendered/
household
inequalities?
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tive need but equates this with the views of the party and state
functionaries. Need is identified with one particular form of
codified knowledge, which reflects constellations of power incom-
patible with the pursuit of truth. Communitarian models interpret
need as those interests defined by particular cultural groups or
communities. They thus make relative the idea of universal
human need and denude it of an evaluative or moral role. None of
the three systems embody a notion of human need that is univer-
sal and objective, yet open-ended and cumulative.
I now tum to see how far this ideal can be realized within
various forms of mixed or "impure" economic systems. I focus here
solely on mixed capitalist systems, that is, where markets have a
dominant role in economic coordination and where private owner-
ship of the means of production is the dominant form of property
ownership. According to the tripartite model developed above, this
generates two fundamental forms of capitalist mixed economy. The
first is statist capitalism, where market coordination is accom-
panied by a substantial degree of state steering of the economy.
The second is corporatist capitalism, where the market is accom-
panied by coordination via networks of negotiation between key
economic actors. Where both of these are absent, or weakly
developed, or deliberately undermined, we may identify a third
variant: neoliberal capitalism.
I now look at each of these in turn. Though we are here moving
from "as pure as possible" economic systems to "impure" or mixed
systems, I continue to abstract from the complexities of the real
world and to analyze models of idealized mixed systems. A real-
world economy, such as Germany's, will in practice exhibit fea-
tures drawn from all these in a bewildering array.
Statist Capitalism
Statist capitalism may be interpreted as a return to seven-
teenth and eighteenth century mercantilism. But it can claim at
least three intellectual and historical sources since the emergence
of industrial capitalism in Britain in the later eighteenth century.
First, and most important, is the continental European perspective
of statism associated with the writings of Weber, Hintze, List, and
Wagner, among others [Skocpol 1985]. This stresses the existence
of "states" (as distinct from "governments") that develop extensive
capacities and a wide range of roles. These states engage in rela-
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tions with other states, promote economic development deemed
essential for the competitiveness of second-order industrializing
countries, and develop social policies to enhance social integra-
tion. This case for statist capitalism is essentially integrative and
developmental. Second is the "socialized liberalism" of Anglo-
Saxon thought, beginning with J. S. Mill and continuing in the
writings of other "reluctant collectivists" such as Keynes and
Beveridge. Here the case for state intervention may be typified as
pragmatic and reactive. Third is the strategy of welfare statism
developed by Fabian social thought and social democratic politics
in the twentieth century. Here the state's role is proactive and
egalitarian. These three strands-conservative, liberal, and
socialist-have thus generated different conceptions of the
economic and social role of the state. There has been no single
route to statist capitalism.
To help define the concept of statist capitalism further, we
need to consider in more detail the distinctive roles of the state in
economic and social intervention. These can be classified in
various ways. According to Putterman [1990, chap. 2.5],
capitalism can be modified by means of four types of intervention.
First, and, he argues, least contradictory to the essence of
capitalism, is to correct for market failures such as monopoly, ex-
ternalities, and the inability to provide public goods. Second is to
modify the distributive results of market mechanisms combined
with private ownership via an assortment of redistributive
policies. Third, there are a set of reactive macroeconomic interven-
tions intended to correct for systemic market failures in the factor
markets for capital and labor, of which Keynsianism is the best-
known example. This third form indicates that the market cannot
be self-regulating in important areas of activity. Fourth, there are
proactive interventions to steer the economy in a desired direc-
tion. These last, including indicative planning and specific or
"parametric" industrial policies, attempt to provide direction to
economic activities at the industry or enterprise level. I will define
statist capitalism, as an ideal type, as a system where all four
levels of state intervention are practiced. ^ ^
Let us now evaluate statist capitalism according to our proce-
dural and material preconditions for optimizing welfare. In
theory, it can overcome the deficits of laissez-faire capitalism. In
terms of our procedural preconditions, collective interests can be
defined in a nonutilitarian way and asserted over powerful sec-
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tional interests. State planning can provide the means to prioritize
certain basic needs as goals of policy and can act to modify or steer
the market where it prevents their achievement. Democratic,
educational, and administrative processes can supplement, or
where necessary override, self-interested action in the market to
impose universal, need-oriented values over the pursuit of private
wants and sectional interests.
In the material domain, market failures can be compensated or
regulated to improve the composition of output in a welfare-
oriented direction. Thus, monopoly and externalities can be taxed
or regulated by public authority. At the same time, the strengths
of markets as mechanisms for identifying need satisfiers, notably
those that take the form of commodities and are congruent with
wants, are retained. At the distribution stage, the lack of entitle-
ments of the poor and the maldistribution of resources according to
need can be corrected by using the familiar instruments of the wel-
fare state. These can include not only taxation, social security
benefits, and public services, but also wage and price and training
policies designed to alter the distribution of primary incomes. Last,
the effectiveness of the need transformation process can be im-
proved in at least two directions. Equal opportunities legislation,
public support for child care, and other family-support policies can
diminish gender inequalities, while employment programs of
various kinds can reduce unemployment and thus directly enhance
economic participation with benefits for individual autonomy.
These potential benefits of a "mixed economy welfare state"
have come under attack in recent years from proponents of the
New Right, who contend that govemment failure is always and
everywhere more likely than and more pernicious than market
failure. In practice, they contend, none of our procedural precondi-
tions are met in a mixed economy, even if they were desirable.
State intervention is not rational because it cannot concentrate the
dispersed knowledge of actors in a single body; to imagine other-
wise is to suffer a "synoptic delusion." Nor is such intervention
universal in intent, since governments are susceptible to numerous
pressures from organized interest groups seeking to advance their
own interests, and these pressures are self-reinforcing. At the
same time, state action weakens the effectiveness of markets and
thus their ability to identify those needs that are congruent with
wants. State intervention also generates inefficiency and
"sclerosis" in production to meet needs, both directly within the
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public sphere and indirectly by harming the efficiency of the
private sector in a variety of ways. Thus, democratically managed
capitalism negates its own goals and undermines the material
basis for satisfying its citizens' needs.
Many of these criticisms have in turn been criticized by writers
within the institutionalist school. The public choice models of
Downs, Olson, and others do not in fact predict human behavior
very welL People often act unselfishly or in "unproductive" ways
by voting in elections, by not cheating when nobody is looking, and
so on. Furthermore, these neoliberal critics adumbrate an essen-
tialist view of the market and the state. Neither are situated in
relation to each other, or in the context of the moral and social
order of which they are a part.'^
Nevertheless, a new institutionalist analysis would recognize
certain elements of truth in the neoliberal critique and add some
more defects of its own. An interventionist state entails a danger
of clientelist politics, wherein special interest groups can lobby or
"capture" state agencies to pursue their specific interests. This
danger is especially pronounced when state intervention expands
from the first to the fourth of the categories above-from
parametric regulation to enterprise-specific regulation. Rather
than the state representing the public interest and imposing
generalizable goals over sectional interests, sectional interests
may extend the pursuit of their goals through political as well as
market means [Skocpol 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985]. By
definition, this will impede the identification of universal needs.
At the same time, state intervention may lack legitimacy and
stability. Neither bureaucratic nor technocratic rationality is ade-
quate once state intervention shifts from allocative to productive
activity [Offe 1975; Mayntz 1983].
Turning from procedural to material preconditions for im-
proved need satisfaction, statist capitalism is still vulnerable, al-
though it exhibits several advances over minimally regulated
capitalism. States may lack either the willingness or the capacity
to intervene in the appropriate ways (or both). The former re-
quires a minimum degree of autonomy from dominant forces in
civil society, thus making it vulnerable to the problems discussed
above. It also requires bureaucratic capacities, including material
resources, a bureaucratic "esprit de corps," and access to relevant
expertise, which are not always forthcoming. Moreover, where
they are forthcoming, they may well generate further limits. The
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limits of bureaucratic state regulation are by now well rehearsed.
The lack of detailed, "thick" information, or experiential
knowledge, leads to the formal application of rules, which can
generate inefficiencies [Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985]. Where the
state is directly delivering need satisfiers in the form of public ser-
vices, this can lead to the abuse of clients and the provision of in-
appropriate satisfiers [Doyal and Gough 1991, chap. 14]. Together
these procedural and material defects can generate an
authoritarian, corrupt, and (what is referred to in Brazil and else-
where as) an "anti-welfare state," which acts to protect the inter-
ests of powerful groups at the expense of the needs of the mass of
the people.
At best, a proactive state is no more than a means for the
achievement of a needs-oriented policy: it may be a necessary con-
dition, but it cannot be sufficient. Statist capitalism may be more
conducive to meeting human needs than unregulated capitalism,
but the answer is indeterminate in the absence of further informa-
tion on the direction and nature of state policy. To answer this, we
must turn to the nature of civil society and the case for a third
mode of economic coordination.
Corporatist Capitalism
Institutionalist economics argues that successful market rela-
tions need to be "embedded" within not only a system of public
authority, but also a network of relations in civil society. Market
transactions in conditions of uncertainty require a degree of trust
between the parties that they will behave according to the agree-
ment [Bardach and Eccles 1991]. On this basis, networks of
relationships that sustain trust are featured as a third form of
economic coordination. In contrast to market or hierarchy, these
coordinate through less formal, more cooperative and negotiated
means. These in turn enhance a longer-term perspective and a
broadened conception of self-interest, which help reproduce the
networks over time. ^ ^
The other major contributor to a renewed interest in such a
"third way" has been the emergence of democratic "corporatism"
notably in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, which has been
theorized by Schmitter, Lehmbruch, Streeck, and others [see Wil-
liamson 1989 for a survey]. There are two basic components: first,
the centralized organization and representation of major interest
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groups in society and their mutual bargaining, and second, the
regular incorporation of these groups into the policjrmaking
process via bargaining with the state and political parties (some-
times called "concertion"). Katzenstein [1985, 32] adds a third fea-
ture of democratic corporatism: an ideology of social partnership
that integrates differing conceptions of group interest with vague
but firmly held notions of the public interest.
This third form of economy has been conceptualized as a dis-
tinct "associative" logic of social order by Streeck and Schmitter
[1985] and as a "democratic communitarian" third way by Boswell
[1990]. Both recognize various historical antecedents, including
Durkheim's writings on solidarity and corporations, personalist
Christian democratic thought, the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic church (in particular the Papal encyclicals of 1891 and
1931), and the associationalism of Saint Simon and early
socialists. Boswell has done most to theorize this third way as a
derivative of communitarian thought. Rejecting all-inclusive com-
munities, for reasons similar to those advanced above, he argues
in favor of fostering "fraternity" and participation in larger
groups. He claims that the nation-state is still the prime site of
such community identification today [Boswell 1990, chap. 3]. This
is close to Miller's [1989, chap. 9] argument that nations are the
only possible form in which an overall community can be realized
in modern societies, so long as this community is sited within a
political organization of citizenship.
Economic forms of such a national community can be fostered
in various ways, including corporate public responsiveness and
collaborative industrial relations. In all these examples, "external
colloquy" is the crucial element that prevents organizations from
pursuing their own narrow goals and from defying the public in-
terest. Perhaps the most notable modem-day example of this
"public cooperation" is corporatist participation in certain
European countries. This parallels Streeck and Schmitter's [1985]
characterization of "associationalism" as a distinct model of social
order in the modern world. ^ ^ Here collective actors of functionally
defined interest associations are constrained and enabled to relate
and negotiate with each other. "The central principle is that of
concertation, or negotiation within and among a fixed set of inter-
est organizations that mutually recognize each other's status and
entitlements and are capable of reaching and implementing rela-
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tively stable compromises (pacts) in the pursuit of their interests"
[Streeck and Schmitter 1985,10].
To explain the emergence and persistence of these structures of
"public cooperation" or "responsible associative governance," two
distinct approaches have typically been adopted drawing on
Durkheim and Marx, respectively. The first looks for features in
the social structure that enhance solidarity, such as the continuity
of organizations, their numbers in relation to the size of the nation,
the background proximities between decision makers, and the
salience of communitarian beliefs [Boswell 1990, chaps. 5-9]. The
second, however, explains them in terms of class structure, power,
and conflict. Workers have an incentive to unite and pursue collec-
tive action to overcome their individual powerlessness in the labor
market. The two dominant power resources that they can con-
struct are trade unions and class-based political parties. According
to Przeworski [1986], it would be rational for a workers' move-
ment, under plausible assumptions about the behavior of
capitalists and workers, to pursue a strategy of accommodation
with capital. Thus, corporatism is another label, and a confusing
one, for societal interclass conflict and bargaining [Korpi 1983;
Esping-Andersen 1985,1990].
On the basis of this second perspective, Katzenstein [1985,
chap. 3] distinguishes two fundamental forms: liberal corporatism
and social corporatism. The former is found where powerful and
centrally organized business communities confront relatively
decentralized and weak labor movements. The latter is found
where there exist strong, centralized, and politically powerful labor
unions, with or without an equivalent business community.^^ The
work of Esping-Andersen [1990] suggests that liberal corporatism
is often combined with the influence of Christian democratic ideol-
ogy, whereas social corporatism is the associate of social
democratic ideology. Thus, the two explanations may be combined
to explain in different ways the persistence of two distinct forms of
corporatism, concertation and public cooperation. Both, however,
envisage corporatist arrangements as a complement to the role of
market and state. Most analyses also assume a substantial pro-ac-
tive role for the state. Associationalism is thus, in practice, com-
bined with statism to form a hybrid third form of capitalism.
What, then, are the pros and cons of corporatist capitalism as a
procedural and material framework for the improvement and op-
timization of need satisfactions? At a procedural level, corporatist
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capitalism offers several advantages. By encouraging reciprocity,
shared norms, and trust, it nourishes a rational yet democratic
process of identifying collective interests and thus, potentially,
universal human needs. By retaining the informational
mechanisms of the market, it enables practical knowledge to be
tapped. Yet by fostering dialogic democracy, it discourages a
short-term view of economic self-interest and the incentive for
those with money to exit while enhancing the mechanisms of
voice. Futhermore, Offe and Wiesenthal [1980] argue that in the
process of class struggle and bargaining, workers' organizations
can only achieve their interests by partially redefining them. This
"dual logic of collective action" means that the labor movement in-
terprets material well-being broadly, moving beyond sectional
economic interests toward something approaching a conception of
broader human needs. This suggests that institutions of social cor-
poratism will tend to pursue need-related goals to a greater extent
than those of liberal corporatism.
Against this must be set several risks. In the absence of a
universal framework for public cooperation, corporatist practices
can degenerate into cartels, particularism, and clientelism. Both a
relatively autonomous state and a shared normative framework
are necessary to counteract these threats. Bargaining between or-
ganized groups by definition excludes unorganized groups, which
are likely to comprise those whose needs are most clearly ignored
and whose "claimsmaking" needs to be most encouraged. This also
contributes to an imbalance of power, which undermines the effec-
tiveness of democratic practices. It is probable, however, that so-
cial corporatism promises a more inclusive and equal system of
interest representation than liberal corporatism and is therefore
less open to these criticisms. Last, the national basis of assoc-
iationalism today threatens to exclude outsiders, such as migrant
workers, from the benefits of citizenship and participation.^*
Our material preconditions for need satisfaction are more like-
ly to be met in several respects than under the previous economic
systems considered here. By supplementing market and state
mechanisms with networks of interest intermediation, cor-
poratism offers several gains in the production of need satisfiers.
Information passed through networks is "thicker" than informa-
tion obtained in the market and "freer" than that communicated
in a hierarchy [Kaneko and Imai, as quoted in Powell 1991; cf
Elson 1988]. Longer-term perspectives will also foster the produc-
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tion of more efficient services and programs to meet needs. Accord-
ing to Streeck and Schmitter [1985], "private interest govenment"
more effectively combines policy formation with policy implemen-
tation and thus enhances the delivery of specific need satisfiers. ^ ^
As regards distribution, democratic communitarianism is likely
to prioritize policies to eliminate poverty, defined as a degree of
deprivation that seriously impairs participation in one's society
[Boswell 1990, chap. 3]. Insofar as this is so, it will aid the dis-
tribution of satisfiers according to need. Social corporatism is like-
ly to go further and add a more radical redistribution to its agenda.
The emphasis on worker participation is likely to promote the pur-
suit of need-related policies within the production process. How-
ever, the impact of corporatist capitalism on the need
transformation process is at best neutral or indeterminate. Insofar
as it prioritizes production-based interest groups, it could act to
marginalize women and the household sphere. The historic in-
fluence of Catholicism in European variants of liberal corporatism
has imparted a bias against gender-equality policies that is absent
in social corporatism.
Neoliberal Capitalism
The 1980s have witnessed a reaction against both statist and
corporatist capitalism on the part of those arguing for a restoration
of minimally regulated capitalism. This combines elements of
liberal and conservative thought in a novel combination, dubbed
"the free economy and the strong state" by Gamble [1988]. This
New Right program is of course associated with the Thatcher and
Reagan administrations in the United Kingdom and the United
States. In many Third World countries, it has been imposed from
the outside via IMF-led structural adjustment programs.
I will deal with this third form of contemporary capitalism
briefly, since it seeks to reestablish a system of minimally regu-
lated capitalism that has already been surveyed. However, it does
introduce a new element: the paradoxical development of the
powers of the state in order to "roll back the state." This stems in
particular from the argument of public choice theory, that interest
group, bureaucratic, and electoral pressures generate a continually
expanding but inefficient set of state interventions in the economy
and society. Thus, the modem democratic state subverts the
freedom of the market order [Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, chap.3].
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To overcome this requires a strategy to reduce the powers of both
the state apparatus and organizations in civil society. Thus, two
characteristic policies flow from this: on the one hand, deregula-
tion, privatization, and tax cuts and on the other, a restatement of
the rule of law and a reduction of the powers of trade unions and
other institutions that lie between the state and the individual
[Gamble 1988, chap. 2].
It is likely that such a combination of policies will prove to be
harmful to our procedural and material preconditions for need
satisfaction. The advantages and deficiencies of minimally regu-
lated capitalism have already been rehearsed. To the negative
overall balance must here be added, however, the deliberate use of
state power, not to further collective, generalizable goals, but to
buttress the pursuit of individual interests and the market order.
Furthermore, state power is also used to disperse the networks of
corporatist negotiation that might form the alternative basis for
the emergence of generalizable interests. Bereft of the counter-
vailing power of public authority and of networks of public
cooperation, we would predict that this form of capitalism will
serve less well as a societal framework for improving human need
satisfaction than corporatist capitalism and many forms of statist
capitalism.
Conclusion
Table 3 summarizes the pros and cons of the three mixed forms
of capitalism. Neoliberal capitalism, I predict, would be no more
conducive to human flourishing than minimally regulated
capitalism. Indeed, according to Gamble [1988], its defining fea-
ture-a combination of "free market and strong state'-promises a
poorer performance. It is bereft of both the countervailing power
of public authority and the networks of public cooperation. This
form of capitalism has a poor chance of realizing the procedural
and material framework for improving human need satisfaction
identified earlier.
The potential impact of statist capitalism on human well-being
is, I conclude, indeterminate. While it has a potential to correct for
the tunnel vision and market failures of minimally regulated
capitalism, it also contains a potential for authoritarian, clien-
telist, and bureaucratic features that distort both procedural and
material effectiveness. At best, a proactive state is no more than a
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Table 3. Evaluation of Three Mixed Economic Systems
Criteria
PI. Rational
identification
ofneed8
P2. Use of
practical
knowledge
P3.
Democratic
resolution
Ml. Efiident
production of
need satisliers
M2.
Distribution
according to
need
M3.
Effective
need trans-
formation
Statist
Capitalism
Identification of
certain collective
interests, but elite
domination
Indeterminate
potential to
improve market
effectiveness
Wider domain of
public sphere,
but bureaucratism
and/or clientelism
Potential to overcome
market failures but
bureaucratic failures
Indeterminate
potential to
redistribute accord-
ing to need
Indeterminate
potential to improve
labor and gender
equality
Corporatist
Capitalism
Social capsule and
collective ethic
favor identification
ofneeds
Potential to com-
bine market and
network knowl-
edge, but exclusion
of unorganized
Nurtures dialogic
democracy, but
exclusion of
unorganized
Potential to over-
come market and
bureaucratic
failures
Social entitlements
to basic need
satisflers likely
Social corporatism:
potential to
improve labor/
gender equality
Neoliberal
Capitalism
Absent. Both market
and state weaken
"social capsuIeV
collective ethic
Market-based
knowledge fostered;
claimsmaking
discouraged
Market and state used
to restrict democratic
public sphere
Efllciency in commodity
production but
market failures and
absence of
noncommodity forms
No social
entitlements to
need satisfiers
Market and gender
related inequalities
in labor and
household
means for the achievement of a needs-oriented policy: it may be a
necessary condition, but it cannot be sufficient. Statist capitalism
may be more conducive to meeting human needs than unregulated
capitalism, but the answer is indeterminate in the absence of fur-
ther information on the direction and nature of state policy.
In principle, corporatist capitalism permits the dominant
market mechanism to be regulated by both public action and social
constraints collectively negotiated by key economic actors. Thus, it
has the potential to overcome market and state failures in the
material realm and to foster some form of dialogic democracy in
the procedural realm. Against this must be set the danger that un-
organized groups will remain excluded from the corporatist
decision-making bodies, and thus that their needs will be over-
looked or overridden. Though this danger is greater under liberal
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corporatism, it is still present under social corporatism, par-
ticularly for groups identified according to extra-economic criteria
such as women and ethnic groups.
To arrive at some definitive ranking of these different sets of
economic institutions is not possible in the absence of explicit
trade-offs between our six preconditions. While we argue that
Rawls [1972] and the work of some of his followers, such as Pogge
[1989], provide some important signposts to help in answering
this question, we do not pretend to advance a comprehensive solu-
tion [Doyal and Gough 1991, chaps. 7 and 11]. My own view is
that the weight of argument emanating from institutional or
political economy theory favors corporatist capitalism on both pro-
cedural and material grounds, and within this category it favors
social over liberal corporatism. Neoliberal capitalism appears to
offer the poorest framework for optimally satisfying universal
human needs, while statist capitalism is indeterminate.
Let me conclude by noting the two ways in which this analysis
could be advanced. One is normative and entails enquiring
whether feasible alternative socioeconomic arrangements could
perform better than social corporatist capitalism in meeting
human needs. It is important to repeat that only mixed capitalist
systems are considered here. The claims of market socialism or
the economics of partnership, for example, are not investigated.^ *^
The second route is empirical. It entails constructing operational
indicators of these idealized economic systems that can be applied
to real-world national economies. These can then be correlated
with the historical record of substantive need satisfaction of dif-
ferent nation-states. In this way, the conclusions reached in this
paper can hopefully be tested against real-world evidence [Gough
and Thomas 1993].
Note8
1. However, we have argued in Doyal and Gough [1991,
chaps. 6-7] that this goal is closely associated with
other moral goals including the Rawlsian interpreta-
tion of social justice.
2. For a survey of research on the former, see Wilensky
et al. [1987]. For a critique and the case for a focus on
policy outputs, see Alber et al. [1987] and the work of
Esping-Andersen [1990].
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3. For the moment, too, we leave open the question of
whether all six of these societal preconditions are com-
patible, or whether there are conflicts between any of
them.
4. See Hodgson [1988] and Etzioni [1988]. The labels are
confusing here. "The new institutionalism" usually
refers to modifications of neoclassical economics,
which take into account such factors as the dynamic
nature of all economic life as an adjustment to uncer-
tainty [Hayek 1948, and the Austrian school] or the
problems stemming from information and transaction
costs and the incentives these give for the estab-
lishment of durable economic institutions [Coase
1937, 1960; Williamson 1985]. These all, however,
retain a commitment to rational, maximizing in-
dividuals as the basic units of analysis, a feature ex-
plicitly rejected by the American institutionalist
school of Commons, Veblen, and others described in
Mayhew [1987].
5. However, Polanyi can be criticized for failing to
"embed" the concept of the market itself within social
relations and for thus retaining an essentialist idea of
markets. See Lie [1991].
6. Examples include Katzenstein [1985], Hall [1986], and
Weir et al. [1988]. For a general analysis, see March
and Olsen [1984].
7. As Cammack [1989] notes, this second strand is close
to an "integrated Marxist account" that combines class
organizations and a relatively autonomous state ac-
ting within a field or general logic of international
capitalism. Nor does the first strand necessarily entail
the second, or vice versa. Yet, as Cammack points out,
some notion of systemic prerequisites, or "environ-
mental incentives," is necessary if one is to assess the
extent to which institutions are functional or dysfunc-
tional. For this reason, and because the two are so
often intertwined, I will take the two strands together
as constituting the structural-historical strand of new
institutionalism.
8. For a related but different taxonomy, see Sjostrand
[1992]. As I will argue below, no real-world economy
Economic Institutions and the Satisfaction of Human Needs 69
or mode of production relies solely on only one of
these mechanisms; and this applies also to most real-
world institutions such as the family.
9. As do Streeck and Schmitter [1985]. As a result of
this identification, they posit a fourth "associative"
model of social order distinct from that of "com-
munity." However, I will argue below, following Bos-
well [1990], that their associational order can be
considered as a subset of a broadly communitarian
mode of economic coordination.
10. This paragraph draws in particular on Hodgson
[1988, chaps. 7-9], Penz [1986], Liess [1976], Hirsch
[1976], and the essays in Ellis and Kumar [1983],
notably those by Crouch, Ellis and Heath, and
Kumar.
11. This section draws on Westoby [1983], Nove [1983],
Feher et al. [1983], Nove and Nuti [1972], Komai
[1980], and Hodgson [1984, chap. 11].
12. One person to address these issues is Devine [Cohen
and Devine 1988], who proposes a comprehensive sys-
tem of interest representation at national, regional,
industry, and enterprise levels, coupled with an in-
stitutionalized form of "negotiated coordination" to
determine all investments and capacity changes in
production units. He also specifies the roles of a
democratic state in regulating the economic system.
However, if this system is designed to supplant
market-determined prices in many parts of the
economic system, it is extremely likely that familiar
problems of interest group behavior would be en-
countered. For example, the demands such a commit-
tee system would make on citizens' time would
encourage many, especially the least organized, to opt
out. If it is advocated as a third form of coordination
to supplement state and market relations, then it has
much to offer in developing a mixed form of economic
system discussed below.
13. On this basis, Katzenstein [1985, 20] regards Japan
and France as exemplars of statist capitalism in the
developed capitalist world, though his conclusion is
dependent on the existence of the third category of
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corporatist capitalism discussed below. See also Shon-
field [1965, chaps. 5 and 7] on France.
14. At times, this generates a marked inconsistency be-
tween the analysis of interest group formation and the
requirement for restraint and virtue in the public
sphere, an inconsistency that Hayek overcomes by ad-
vocating traditional values and a "strong state" to
restrain the rationalist pursuit of self-interest. This
recognizes and reinstates the interdependence of
markets on state and community, but in a way that
threatens our third procedural precondition.
15. Complementarity, accommodation, and reciprocity are
said to characterize successful network relations in
economic production such as those in Japan. See read-
ings in Thompson et al. [1991] and Hodgson [1988]. It
is interesting that the genesis of reciprocity is ex-
plained in two different ways, corresponding to the
division between economic and sociological/anthropo-
logical paradigms discussed above. On the one hand,
game theory shows how cooperative behavior can en-
hance individual interest-satisfaction. On the other
hand, anthropologists emphasize the normative stand-
ards and obligations that sustain exchange relations.
The centrality of cooperation and networks is agreed
but for very different reasons [Powell 1991].
16. Streeck and Schmitter [1985] are explicit that associa-
tions signal a fourth order of economic coordination
distinct from market, state, and community. However,
elsewhere they see them as a series of pragmatic ad-
justments within capitalist society [1985, 23], with
historical antecedents in late medieval cities [1985,
10]. They also share several features in common with
the community order, for example, a logic of inter-
dependence between actors, compared with one of in-
dependence in markets and dependence in hierarchies
[1985, 11] and a central role for negotiation between
roughly equal entities-the difference being that the
entities are organizations rather than individuals. For
these reasons, and in the light of Boswell's [1990] ar-
guments, I consider that they are better conceived of
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as modern forms of community order within mixed
capitalist economies.
17. Kohli [1987] argues that the balance of class forces
also explains differences in the alleviation of poverty
between three states in India, considering that the
Communist regime in West Bengal acted like a Third
World social-democratic govemment. Penz [1993]
considers that this, along with similar historical ex-
amples of class conflict, invalidates the "consensiial"
perspective developed here. However, the fact that
inter-group bargaining develops out of protracted
class struggle does not undermine the fact that a new
mechanism of coordination has evolved. Moreover, as
in the rest of this paper, my arguments on social cor-
poratism do not translate directly and without media-
tion to real economies in the real world.
18. For an interesting debate on some of these issues, see
the paper by Cohen and Rogers [1992] and replies to
it in a special issue o{Politics and Society.
19. More recently, Streeck and Schmitter [1991] have ar-
gued that the age of national corporatism ended in
the 1980s in the face of shifts in the global economy,
the demise of national sovereignty, and the decay of
traditional interest associations. For indirect evi-
dence that corporatist national policy regimes con-
tinue to persist, see Pfaller, Gough, and Therborn
[1991]. More strongly, it is contended that cor-
poratism is a national form without any international
equivalent in the advanced capitalist world let alone
in the Third World. In the introduction to this paper,
I note that I cannot tackle these international issues
here though they are undoubtedly of profound impor-
tance for the viability of the negotiated coordination
model. The answers to these points do not undermine
the case for corporatist capitalism as a framework for
satisfying human needs, but they do raise questions
about its feasibility.
20. These issues are well explored in Elster and Moene
[1989] and Meade [1989].
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